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Bankruptcy, Morality & Student Loans: A Decade of Error in
Undue Hardship Analysis
LINN WHITE*
In an effort to stem perceived abuses of the bankruptcy system,
Congress adopted a rule in 1976 that created a time-based conditional
limitation on the discharge of federally guaranteed student loans in
bankruptcy. The only means of overcoming the limitation was the showing
of an “undue hardship,” which was undefined by the legislature. This gave
rise to two judicially created, means-based tests that were used to determine
if the debtor was attempting to abuse the bankruptcy system. By the time
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA) was enacted, the time-based restriction was gone, leaving only
the undue hardship exception to student debtors seeking relief against an
expanded pool of protected creditors. Meanwhile, the judiciary has largely
continued to apply the same two means-based tests from 1978.
However, using a detailed analysis of statutory history, statutory
construction, and case law, this paper reveals deep flaws in the fundamental
reasoning that underpins the current judicial rationale. Through an
uncritical acceptance of specious moral arguments, coupled with the
concomitant failure to objectively assess the history and plain language of
BAPCPA, both the judiciary and some of the staunchest critics of the
conditional discharge have failed to recognize the erroneous application of
the bankruptcy regulations as envisioned by BAPCPA. However, the
research also demonstrates that, with modest changes, the courts could
provide a more humane, ethical, and equitable treatment of student loan
debtors that not only comports with current law, but is actually mandated
by it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than 500 years before the United States came into existence,
English law was already struggling with the issue of how best to deal with
defaulting debtors.1 The early rules and regulations were largely in
response to the fraudulent practices of the nascent merchant class, and as
such, tended to treat the matter as a criminal offense.2 Accordingly, during
the first few centuries of bankruptcy regulation, defaulting debtors were
often subject to imprisonment, pillory, maiming, and even death.3
However, during the Industrial Revolution, the criminal sanctions slowly
gave way to more equitable approaches.4 Essentially, after creditors lost the
ability to imprison debtors, what followed is the struggle between the rights
of creditors and debtors that persists to this day.5 Nonetheless, bankruptcy
protection expanded during the 20th century and gradually afforded more
access to greater numbers of people.6
It is arguably fair to say that since the High Middle Ages, creditors have
waged an unbroken fight against any softening of bankruptcy regulations
and seemed to have the upper hand much of that time, although they
definitely lost ground in the last century.7 However, that lost ground was
somewhat recovered with the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).8 However, in a sense,
the passage of BAPCPA acted more like a cap on a steady erosion of debtor
rights, rather than a sudden reversal of policy for the creditors.9 The slow
erosion of debtor rights is perhaps no more evident than it is in the realm of
student loans and the debtors who carry them.10
The dischargeability of student debt was already facing assault in the
legislature, even before Congress liberalized the bankruptcy law with the
1. See 11 Edw. (1283), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 53, 53-54 (1235-1377)
[hereinafter 11 Edw.].
2. Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy Law, 67 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1919).
3. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 7, 10 (1995).
4. See id. at 11-12.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 26-27.
7. See id. at 7.
8. H. R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
9. H. R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 89 (creating mandatory tests).
10. See John A. E. Pottow, The Nondischargeability of Student Loans in Personal Bankruptcy
Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CAN. BUS. L. J. 245, 246 (2006).
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Bankruptcy Code of 1978.11 As such, by the time Congress enacted the
1978 Code, student loans in bankruptcy had already succumbed to the
attack.12 Absent the showing of an “undue hardship,” a time-based
restriction of five years conditioned the discharge of student loans.13
Through the years, the time-based restriction was slowly eliminated, while
the pool of protected creditors was expanded.14 However, Congress
declined to define the term “undue hardship,” instead leaving the matter up
to the judiciary.15 The judicially constructed tests from that period largely
survive untouched to this day, nearly forty years later.16
This paper will first briefly explore the history of bankruptcy law,
starting with the Statute of Merchants in 1283, through the most recent
changes in BAPCPA.17 From there, the research will show that not only did
the proponents of tighter restrictions on student loan discharges rely on
demonstrably false assertions, but that the manner in which they used them
has clouded rational discourse on the matter ever since.18 With that
foundation established, it will be shown that the judiciary is utilizing a
statutory construction that is more applicable to the old Bankruptcy Code,
rather than the current law.19 Further, the research will demonstrate that the
usage of the two predominant, judicially constructed tests for undue
hardship violates both the mandate and the plain language of BAPCPA.20
Then, a statutory construction and undue hardship analysis that properly
accords with both the current state of the law and the legislature’s intentions
will be presented.21 Finally, it will be shown that it is the uncritical
acceptance of specious moral arguments by both the courts and the critics of
the conditional discharge of student loans that has led to over a decade of
judicial error.22

11. See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 439(A), 90 Stat. 2081, 2141
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012)).
12. See id. at §§ 439(A)-440, 90 Stat. at 2141.
13. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523, 92 Stat. 2549, 2590-91 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2016)).
14. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An
Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 421 (2005).
15. See id.
16. H. R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 89.
17. See infra Part II; see also infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part IV.A.
22. See infra Part V.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY
Modern bankruptcy laws in the United States could fairly, if loosely, be
said to trace their origins to a series of English statutes from the latter part
of the High Middle Ages.23 The first of these was the Statute of Merchants,
which was enacted in 1283.24 Though not specifically naming bankruptcy,
the statute codified the means by which a merchant could affect a
recognizance of a debt owed.25 Thus, if a creditor “lent their [g]oods to
divers [sic] persons, be greatly impoverished” by lack of payment, this new
scheme provided a legal framework to seize the defaulting debtor’s assets.26
The act as fashioned was followed shortly thereafter by a second iteration of
the Statute of Merchants in 1285.27 The former statute had provisioned for
creditors to compel a sheriff to seize a delinquent debtor’s assets, and if no
assets were found, they could then subsequently seize and imprison the
debtor.28
Apparently, many of the local sheriffs were either reluctant to, or
otherwise avoided enforcement of, the provisions of the 1283 Act, which
gave rise to an expanded authority within the later statute.29 Among other
things, that expanded authority allowed the creditor to seize the debtor as
the first remedy for default.30 Even though the text of the aforementioned
acts specifically referred to merchants, it seems that many “non-merchants”
also availed themselves of the remedies afforded by the legislation.31
Evidently, this occurred with such frequency that the practice warranted
passage of Chapter XXXIII of “The New Ordinances,” which specifically
limited actions under the Statute of Merchants to those “between
[m]erchants and [m]erchants, and of [m]erchandises [sic] made between
them . . . .”32 Noting that many non-merchants “do feel much aggrieved and
fined by the Statute of Merchants made at Acton Burnell,” the legislators
sought to try and prevent abuse of the system.33

23. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 7-8.
24. See 11 Edw., supra note 1, at 53-54 (this statute was also known as the Statute of ActonBurnell, and the title and commencement are noted as such in French in an unnumbered note at the
bottom of the page).
25. See id.
26. See id. (alteration in original).
27. See 13 Edw. (1285), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 98 (1235-1377) [hereinafter 13
Edw.].
28. See 11 Edw., supra note 1, at 53-54.
29. See 13 Edw., supra note 27, at 98-100.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. 5 Edw. 2 c. 33 (1311), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 165 (1235-1377)
[hereinafter 5 Edw. 2] (alteration in original).
33. See id.
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To that end, the ordinance first required that “four good and lawful
[m]en” testify that the recognizance was for a mercantile debt.34 Second,
the ordinance limited where and to whom those recognizances could be
delivered and registered.35 While the grievances that non-merchants
complained of are not detailed, it is clear that rules distinguishing
commercial debtors were already being implemented.36 It appears that the
specific designation of a “bankrupt” does not make the official record until
the reign of King Henry VIII; however, author Louis Levinthal noted in
1919 that “although no laws were made against bankrupts specifically by
that name prior to that time . . . laws were made against those persons who
today are called bankrupts.”37 As such, Mr. Levinthal detailed the passage
of several acts after the Statue of Merchants that are essentially the
forerunners to modern laws regarding fraudulent transfers.38
Levinthal went on to point out that those early statutes were limited to
transfers for the debtor’s benefit and failed to account for transfers in
preference of one creditor over another.39 It is here that the Statute of
Bankrupts of 1542 attempted to fill that gap, by introducing the concept of
state enforcement of both: (1) the seizure of debtors; and (2) a ratable
distribution of the debtor’s assets among their various creditors.40 This was
largely deemed preferable, because once a default seemed imminent under
the previous rules, creditors had to go to the authorities in order to establish
priority for their claims.41 Given the nature of communications at the time,
these rules would have clearly left distant creditors at a disadvantage.42 As
an aside, one might note that the rationale is quite analogous to our modern
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 165-67.
37. Levinthal, supra note 2, at 11.
38. See id. at 11-14 (noting 50 Edw. 3 c. 6 (1326), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM
251 (1235-1377) barred collusive land and chattel transfers to friends, whereby the debtor could avoid
the creditor by taking “asylum” and then living off the rents; 13 Eliz. c. 7 (1571), reprinted in 4 THE
STATUTES OF THE REALM 537 (1547-1624) [hereinafter 13 Eliz.] mandated that “[f]lying to a franchise,
or taking sanctuary” was an act of bankruptcy; 21 Jac. c. 15 (1623), reprinted in 4 THE STATUTES OF THE
REALM 1228 (1547-1624) [hereinafter 21 Jac.] (alteration in original) barred transfers of property to
non-creditors, even if accompanied by valuable consideration; 2 Rich. 2 c. 3 (1377), reprinted in THE
STATUTES OF THE REALM 1 (1377-1504) instituted a remedy, where after a debtor had secreted
themselves away in a “privileged place” (i.e., asylum) for a term of five weeks or more, the creditor was
allowed to give notice at the gate of the privileged place via the Sheriff. If the debtor still refused to
come out, the creditor could then seize the debtor’s assets.).
39. See id. at 14.
40. See 34 & 35 Hen. 8 c. 4 (1542), reprinted in 4 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 893, 899-901
(1509-1545) [hereinafter 34 & 35 Hen. 8].
41. See Levinthal, supra note 2, at 13 n.50 (citing EDWARD JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 373 (1912)) (“The machinery for enforcing individual debts was available in the King’s
Courts from the thirteenth century onwards. It is unlikely that any customary process would have
sufficed to restrain the individual creditor from stealing a march upon his fellows.”).
42. See id. at 13.
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bankruptcy statutes regarding so-called preference transfers within the
United States.43 The Supreme Court of the United States summarized the
modern scheme in Union Bank v. Wolas44, writing:
Any creditor that received a greater payment than others of his class
is required to disgorge so that all may share equally. The operation
of the preference section to deter ‘the race of diligence’ of creditors
to dismember the debtor before bankruptcy furthers the second goal
of the preference section—that of equality of distribution.45
Returning to the matter at hand, as one can see, the Statute of Bankrupts
was more akin to a criminal sanction, and as such, the Act was decidedly
both pro-creditor and anti-fraud in nature, as might be gleaned from the
opening paragraph.46 While the depth of the fraud complained of could
reasonably be ascertained by a cursory reading of the Act, the discerning
reader might notice that any underlying circumstances that could innocently
lead one to default are markedly absent.47 Rather, in place of any attempt to
determine causation, a presumption of abuse is clearly evident.48 Even still,
less than thirty years later, “[t]he Act of 13 Elizabeth, c.7 complains that
despite the Act of 34 and 35 Henry VIII, c. 4, fraudulent bankrupts had
much increased . . . .”49
Along with the Fraudulent Conveyances Act of 1571, 13 Elizabeth
further codified the means of dealing with a defaulting debtor’s assets.50
43.
44.
45.
46.

See 11 U.S.C.S. § 547 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-243).
502 U.S. 151 (1991).
Union Bank, 502 U.S.at 161 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177-78 (1977)).
34 & 35 Hen. 8, supra note 40, at 899-901. The original text reads:

Where divers and soondrye persones craftelye obteyning into theyre handes greate substaunce
of other mennes goods doo sodenlie flee to partes unknowne or kepe theyre houses, not
mynding to paie or resotre to any theyre creditoures theyre debtes and dueties, but at theyre
owne willes and pleasures consume the substaunce obtyened by credyte of other men, for
theyre owne pleasures and delicate lyving, againste all reasonee quytie and good conscience
[sic] . . . .
Id. When the text is modernized for clarity, it reads:
Where diverse and sundry persons craftily obtaining into their hands great substance of other
men’s goods do suddenly flee to parts unknown or keep their houses, not minding to pay or
restore to any their debts or duties, but at their own pleasures consume the substance obtained
by credit of other men, for their own pleasures and delicate living, against all reason, equity,
and good conscience . . . .
See id.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See id. at 899.
See id. at 899-900.
Levinthal, supra note 2, at 16.
See 13 Eliz., supra note 38, at 537-38.
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Interestingly, the underlying logic of these rules is still visible in the right of
the modern bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession to avoid many prepetition transfers.51 The years following 13 Elizabeth and leading up to the
American Revolution saw some softening of the bankruptcy statutes in
England.52 Of this, Levinthal noted that the Acts of Anne in 1705 and 1711
“permit[ted] an allowance for maintenance to be made to a bankrupt who
surrenders, and, even more important, grant him a ‘discharge’ from all debts
owing at the commencement of his bankruptcy.”53 Germane to the broader
discussion at hand, regarding the Acts of Anne, Levinthal said:
This provision was probably the consequence not only of pity, but
also of the feeling that mercantile credit is given in the interest of
the creditor as well as of the debtor; that the giving of credit
necessarily involves some risk; that it should be the business of the
trader to insure against this loss by adding on a percentage for the
credit which he advances; and that all the debtor ought to pledge is
his estate, not his future earnings, and certainly not his personal
liberty.54
With that, one can see the gradual acceptance of both the idea of
merchant debt as a necessity, as well as the notion that a merchant creditor
must also bear some responsibility for mitigating the effects of commercial
losses.55 Of course, the legislation discussed thus far has dealt almost solely
with debts incurred between merchants and traders.56 While the treatment
of those defaulting debtors could scarcely be called gentle, one must recall
that the genesis of those laws was to encourage trade.57 Tracing back to the
Statute of Merchants in 1283, apparently after having “lent goods to divers
[sic] persons” at a loss and without recourse, it seems that, quite predictably,
many foreign traders simply stopped coming to England.58 While the
51. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 73 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009).
52. See Levinthal, supra note 2, at 17-18 (citing 21 Jac., supra note 38, at 1228) (though it should
be said that prior to that “softening,” on the previous page, Levinthal made note of a particularly stiff
punishment, which stated that, “pillory and loss of an ear should be the penalty imposed upon debtor
who failed to show that bankruptcy was due solely to misfortune.”).
53. Id. at 18.
54. See id. at 19 n.67 (noting that subsequent legislation “seems to hint” that it was enacted to
combat abusive practices by debtors under the Statutes of Anne). But see Tabb, supra note 3, at 18-19.
55. See id. at 19.
56. See 11 Edw., supra note 1, at 53-54; 13 Edw., supra note 27, at 98; 34 & 35 Hen. 8, supra
note 40, at 899.
57. See 34 & 35 Hen. 8, supra note 40, at 899-901.
58. See 11 Edw., supra note 1, at 53-54 (noting that because of the lack of “speedy” remedies at
law against fraudulent debtors, “and by reason hereof many Merchants [sic] [have withdrawn to come]
into this Realm [sic] with their Merchandises [sic], [sic] to the Damage [sic] as well of the Merchants
[sic] as of the whole Realm . . . .”).
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encouragement of trade might not necessarily justify some of the treatments
that were meted out, it does at least provide a frame of reference for a
clearer understanding of the underlying rationale that drove the formation of
these laws.59
However, the disdain for the non-merchant debtor is not as readily
apparent.60 Of traders, Sir William Blackstone noted rather oddly in 1765
that England gives “the benefit of the laws of bankruptcy to none but actual
traders; since that set of men are, generally speaking, the only persons liable
to accidental losses, and to an inability of paying their debts, without any
fault of their own.”61 This statement is odd, because the assertion clearly
defies both common experience and logic. Nevertheless, Blackstone
subsequently goes to some length to distinguish the criteria for what
constitutes an “actual” trader, noting that the law has expanded the
definition through the years to include bankers and the like, as well as
stockbrokers and others.62 However, the tradesman’s designation was
withheld from those who engaged in “handicraft” occupations, as well as
from innkeepers and even farmers—even though they all ostensibly
engaged in trade.63 Perhaps more tellingly, Blackstone says of the nonmercantile class that “subjecting them to the laws of bankruptcy might be a
means of defeating their landlords of the security which the law has given
them above all others, for the payment of their reserved rents . . . .”64
With that said, one can see early on that defaulting merchant debtors
were largely looked upon with distaste.65 That distaste did not necessarily

59. See Levinthal, supra note 2, at 18-19.
60. See 2 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 471, 473
(Univ. Chicago Press 1979) (1766).
61. Id. at 473.
62. Id. at 475.
63. Blackstone says:
But by the same act, no farmer, grazier, or drover, shall (as such) be liable to be deemed a
bankrupt: for, though they buy and sell corn, and hay, and beasts, in the course of husbandry,
yet trade is not their principal, but only a collateral, object; their chief concern being to
manure and till the ground, and make the best advantage of it’s [sic] produce.
Id. One can see that Blackstone’s analysis is clearly deficient, unless of course the farmers in question
were solely raising crops for their own sustenance. Id. However, a freeholding subsistence farmer
would not comport with Blackstone’s concern about non-merchants being able to defeat a landlord’s rent
receipts via bankruptcy. Id. Further, it is both an observable reality and common sense that a farmer’s
“chief concern” in raising crops does not necessarily impute a lack of means or desire to trade the result
of that effort for profit or gain. Id. Put another way, it would be just as absurd to posit that Ford’s “chief
concern” is to build cars and that selling those cars is but a collateral reason for building them. See id.
As such, it would seem that the assertion above is more likely an attempt to buttress class distinctions
than a conscientious effort to craft a legal doctrine. See id.
64. Id.
65. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 60, at 481.
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arise solely from notions of the inherent immorality of debt.66 Rather, it
would seem that the law was more concerned with curtailing the perceived
fraudulent practices of the native merchant class in England in order to
encourage foreign trade and investment.67 However, as trade grew in
volume and importance (perhaps as a consequence of the statutes), one can
see what appears to be a corresponding shift in the legislation’s tone.68
Blackstone noted that “in this extrajudicial method of proceeding, which is
allowed merely for the benefit of commerce, the law is extremely watchful
to detect a man, whose circumstances are declining.”69 He then went on to
list several statutorily enumerated acts that constitute an act of bankruptcy.70
However, Blackstone then pointed out that if the bankrupt could prove that
their loss was due to innocent misfortune—and could gain creditor
approval—they would be entitled to a certificate that gave them a sort of
general indemnity.71
With that certificate in hand, the debtor merchant was also “entitled to a
decent and reasonable allowance out of his effects, for his future support
and maintenance, and to put him in a way of honest industry.”72 Further,
the debtor was given a discharge of all debts, and “[t]hus the bankrupt
becomes a clear man again; and, by the assistance of his allowance and his
own industry, may become a useful member of the [C]ommonwealth.”73
Obviously, with the deck somewhat stacked in the creditor’s favor, approval
was not always forthcoming.74 Likely in recognition of this fact, subsequent
statutes removed the need for creditor approval, making the discharge a
judicial act.75 However, because the bankruptcy statutes did not apply to
non-merchants, those debtors were barred from receiving the benefit of the
certificate and the corresponding “fresh start.”76 This was attributed to the
notion that:
If persons in other situations of life run in debt without the power of
payment, they must take the consequences of their own indiscretion,
even though they meet with sudden accidents that may reduce their
fortunes: for the law holds it to be an unjustifiable practice, for any
66. See id. at 474, 478-79.
67. Id. at 474.
68. Id. at 477.
69. Id.
70. BLACKSTONE, supra note 60, at 477-79 (noting eleven different means by which a debtor
might seek to fraudulently hide assets or otherwise deprive creditors).
71. Id. at 483.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 484 (alteration in original).
74. See id.
75. See Levinthal, supra note 2, at 19-20.
76. BLACKSTONE, supra note 60, at 473.
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person but a trader to encumber himself with debts of any
considerable value.77
Blackstone failed to address why the practice is unjustifiable for one
party and not the other, though one might presume from the certitude by
which it is expressed that such views were likely common at the time.78
Commentaries does briefly touch on insolvency, “which is an occasional
act, frequently passed by the legislature; whereby all persons whatsoever,
who are either in too low a way of dealing to become bankrupts, or not
being in a mercantile state of life . . . are discharged from all suits and
imprisonment.”79 Note that, even though freed from prison, there is no
mention of debt relief for the insolvent debtor.80 The debtor’s release from
prison by insolvency was only good “upon delivering up all their estate and
effects to their creditors upon oath,” with the further admonishment that any
fraud or perjury would be punished by death.81 Unfortunately for the
debtor, many times their property was only sufficient to affect their release,
leaving the debt intact, whereby “creditors could still use collection devices
other than imprisonment” to come after the debtor.82
The divide between merchant and non-merchant debtors continued well
into the 19th century in both England and the United States.83 In England,
economic historian Paul Johnson notes that “[w]hat really distinguished the
defendants in bankruptcy and small debt proceedings was their social status,
and this mattered because of assumptions made by judges about the
economic motivations of people of different social class.”84 Mr. Johnson
goes on to outline some opinions put forth by judges at the time that seem to
reveal a strong, anti-working class bias.85 The gist of the assertions
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 484 (citing 32 Geo. 2 c. 28; 1 Geo. 3 c. 17; 5 Geo. 3 c. 41; 9 Geo. 3 c. 26).
Id. at 484-85.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 60, at 484.
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 51, at 101.
Id.
Paul Johnson, Creditors, Debtors and the Law in Victorian and Edwardian England, in
PRIVATE LAW AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE: COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES IN
BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 485, 501 (Willibald Steinmetz ed., 2000)
(alteration in original).
85. See id. at 501-02. One of the more pernicious examples is taken from a letter written by
Judge Johnes of the Caernarvon County Court in 1854 that reads:
Take a common case—a young man, without family, earning high wages as a miner or
mechanic, contracts a debt of a few pounds with a small tradesman, who sues him and obtains
judgement. To take out execution against the goods is futile because, though in one sense
wealthy, the defendant probably has none worth levying on. His high wages are possibly
squandered in taverns or secreted in such a way that they cannot be reached by the creditor . .
. The defendants who thus evade and defy their creditors, are commonly men who are, in a
pecuniary sense, much better off than the great majority of the professional men of this
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revolved around the idea that working class debtors intentionally
squandered their wages in lieu of repayment of their debts.86 Further, it
appears that they were often discriminated against simply by the types of
goods they bought.87 Of the latter, Johnson remarks that “[i]t was also
asserted that many of the initial purchases, particularly from itinerant traders
or tallymen, were unnecessary fripperies, so the debtor was doubly
unworthy.”88
The negative estimation of working class debtors is noted as that of the
majority, but apparently, that view was not universally held.89 A prominent
Victorian era legal publication is quoted as being “adamant that fraudulent
debtors constituted ‘an insignificant minority’ of cases” that were heard at
the time.90 It was further asserted that “[t]he majority of debtors were ‘poor
persons to whom credit is often recklessly given, who benefit little by it, to
whom debt is a calamity, whose ‘means’ are so shadowy that evidence of
them is most difficult to present in any satisfactory shape to a judicial
tribunal.’”91 It bears mentioning that all of these notions are strikingly
similar to many popular sentiments one might hear today, nearly 200 years
later.92 If nothing else, the disparity of views expressed highlights the
enduring nature of the conflict.93
country—the wages they receive being commonly higher than the average remuneration of
professional men, especially when we take into account the less refined mode in which they
live . . . On the other hand, the creditors, whose confidence they abuse, generally belong to
the poorest and most necessitous class of small retail dealers, a class who have no superfluous
funds to spend in dubious litigation with knaves, and to whom legal redress, unless it be
really cheap and accessible, is a mockery.
Id. Johnson correctly sums this by noting, “Here we see, combined in one short comment, moral
judgments about the fecklessness of manual workers and the integrity of small traders, together with a
gross misrepresentation of the economic circumstances of working-class life.” Id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 502.
88. Id.
89. See Johnson, supra note 84, at 502.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 502-03.
92. Cf. Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 248
(2005) (statement of Todd Zywicki, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center)
[hereinafter Bankruptcy Reform Hearing] (“Smaller businesses and small creditors suffer the most from
a runaway bankruptcy system, as they tend to have the narrowest margins and the least ability to spread
those losses among their customers.”); UNITED STATES PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, THE
CREDIT CARD TRAP: HOW TO SPOT IT, HOW TO AVOID IT 1 (2001), http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/
files/reports/Credit_Card_Trap_2001_USPIRG.pdf [hereinafter U.S. PIRG] (The report makes note of
“aggressive marketing and misleading tactics,” “outrageous interest rates,” and “bigger profits than
ever.” It also notes that industry proposed legislation to curtail bankruptcies will “encourage credit card
companies to be more predatory in lending, because the risk of issuing cards to higher-risk consumers
such as students and those with low incomes will decline.”).
93. C.f. Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 92, at 248 (statement of Todd Zywicki, Visiting
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center); U.S. PIRG, supra note 92, at 1.
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A. Bankruptcy in the Early United States
While much of the underlying rationale for bankruptcy administration
carried over from English jurisprudence, the post-Revolutionary War
political and economic environment of the United States created a very
different backdrop for the application of that rationale.94 First, large-scale
debt financing of the war had caused widespread distortions in the nascent
U.S. economy.95 As noted in a 2009 book by Bruce H. Mann, “[t]he
Revolution, like all wars, was fought on credit in the form of direct loans
and, more important, of paper currency and scrip issued by the Continental
Congress and state governments.”96 This, coupled with wartime demand for
goods, created a vicious circle of inflation, with a concomitant need for the
continual debasement of the various paper currencies in circulation at the
time.97 Mann also notes the sharp increase in both debt and business
speculation after the war as another factor that drove shifting perceptions of
bankruptcy in the United States.98
Of the time, he says, “[t]he brief postwar boom. . .triggered a rush of
merchants and traders to ports like Philadelphia, all eager to profit in the
commercial frenzy, and all capitalized—and often undercapitalized—on
credit.”99 After the post-war economy contracted, the rate of business
failures increased commensurately, which “made failure the potential
common fate of all merchants.”100 However, similar to Blackstone’s
assertions, there was a perceptual divide between those who speculated in
agriculture and those who speculated in other areas, such as bank stock or
securities.101 While “[f]armers and planters borrowed for current needs or
wants with the expectation of repaying after the harvest,” the ability to
repay the debt accumulated by merchants and financial speculators seems to
have rested largely upon the simple hope that their investments would pan
out.102 As more of the latter sought capital, they “drove up the interest rates
they had to offer to investors, which in turn attracted investments from everwidening circles, both demographically and geographically.”103
The net effect of this was to exacerbate the magnitude of the losses
when the schemes failed, and with the expanded reach of those failures,
94. See BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN
INDEPENDENCE 169 (2009).
95. See id. at 170.
96. Id. at 169.
97. See id. at 169-70.
98. See id. at 175.
99. MANN, supra note 94, at 177.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 190.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 191.
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more and more people found themselves imprisoned for debt.104 As such, it
is not surprising to find a corresponding increase in the number of people
wishing to adopt more forgiving methods of dealing with defaulted debts.105
While there had been several attempts at the state level, the United States’
first national bankruptcy law came into effect in 1800, of which the
Supreme Court made brief mention in Wood v. Owings,106 stating that:
On the 4th of April, 1800, [C]ongress passed an act to establish an
uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States, which
declares, among other things, that any merchant. . .with intent
unlawfully to [sic] delay or defraud his creditors, make or cause to
be made any fraudulent conveyance of his lands or chattels, shall be
deemed and adjudged a bankrupt.107
Beyond Wood, there is scant case law on the scheme, which is not
surprising considering that the law was repealed three years after its
passage.108 As one can see from the text above, the gist of the law was
essentially the same as its English contemporary. In the wake of the failed
1800 bankruptcy act, state law again attempted to fill the gap, though as
author Charles Jordan Tabb points out, due to the unique characteristics of
the federal system, individual states had limited authority to discharge
debts—especially those that originated beyond their respective borders.109
Tabb further notes the gradual decline and eventual abolishment of
imprisonment for debt in the years after the 1800 act was repealed.110
However, debtors still “lacked any means to discharge preexisting debts
during the first four decades of the nineteenth century,” which also gave rise
to various stopgap measures at the state level.111
After a financial crisis struck the United States economy, a new
bankruptcy scheme was enacted in 1841.112 It is here that bankruptcy relief
became available to all debtors in the United States, regardless of merchant
status.113 Tabb says the Act “was a coordinated, simple, and short act of
only seventeen sections” that was apparently a boon to struggling debtors,
but “from the viewpoint of creditors, the 1841 Act, like its 1800
104. See MANN, supra note 94, at 187, 191.
105. See id. at 190.
106. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 239 (1803).
107. Wood, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 250-51.
108. Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (repealing the Bankruptcy Act).
109. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 15 (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122
(1819); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827)).
110. See id. at 16.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 16-17; see also Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440.
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predecessor, was a dismal failure.”114 This Act was also repealed very
shortly after its passage and was not replaced until 1867 after yet another
financial calamity, this one largely attributable to the American Civil
War.115 The procedures envisioned by the 1867 Act proved unappealing to
both debtors and creditors for various reasons—so much so that it was
repealed in 1878.116 However, that Act provided the framework for the
debtor to choose either state or federal non-bankruptcy property
exemptions.117 Debtor choice of exemptions was a novel concept at the
time, and once the idea passed constitutional muster, the essence became
part of the fabric of bankruptcy regulation that persists to this day.118
After another twenty years and much compromise, Congress passed the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.119 In its infancy, this legislation also looked as if it
might be short lived, but with a series of compromises between debtors and
creditors in 1903, “the first enduring American bankruptcy law took
shape.”120 However, the Act was not without its detractors, and with a
strong push “similar to those launched by the credit industry in the 1960s,
1980s, and 1990s,” creditors sought to place payment conditions on “those
debtors with some ability to pay as a condition” of discharge.121 While
those changes did not occur, the 1898 Act was amended extensively by the
1938 Chandler Act, which was passed in the aftermath of the Great
Depression.122 The bulk of the amendments revolved around issues that
pertained to merchant debtors, yet the changes did introduce a new debt
reorganization scheme for “wage earners” and other non-merchants under
Chapter XIII.123
Regarding the impetus for Chapter XIII, the author of the Chandler Act
said, “[a] number of states had debt composition statutes, and section 74 of
the Bankruptcy Act was already in existence. But those various enactments
failed to prevent repeated garnishment proceedings at heavy costs, sheriffs’
fees, and unconscionable judgments against those unable to be represented
by counsel.”124 This was a significant addition, because with this, “Chapter
114. Tabb, supra note 3, at 17-18.
115. See id. at 18-19.
116. Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99 (repealing the bankrupt [sic] law).
117. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 20.
118. See id. at 16.
119. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 51, at 102.
120. Id. at 103.
121. Tabb, supra note 3, at 27.
122. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 51, at 103.
123. See id. at 104.
124. Walter Chandler, The Wage Earners’ Plan: Its Purpose, 15 VAND. L. REV. 169, 169 (1962).
It should be noted that debt compositions are arrangements for valuable consideration among debtors
and creditors, as well as between the creditors themselves. The scheme provides a reduced payment for
the debtor with the creditors taking a pro-rata share. See generally Comment, A Survey of Sections 74
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XIII effectively introduced into consumer bankruptcy the debt compositions
and extensions of state law, coupled with the unique powers of bankruptcy
law, such as the discharge of remaining debt once the debtor completed the
repayment plan.”125
B. Bankruptcy in the Modern Era
A major overhaul of the bankruptcy system occurred again in 1978,
when Congress adopted a bankruptcy bill that was birthed via a ponderous
process that spanned the better part of a decade.126 While not critical to the
present discussion, two provisions—Chapter 7 and Chapter 13—shall be
outlined briefly, as both touch on consumer bankruptcies.127 Warren et al.
characterize Chapter 7 as the “classic ‘straight’ bankruptcy liquidation . . .
.”128 This scheme essentially involves the sale of a debtor’s assets that are
not subject to an exemption, with the proceeds going to the creditors, and
allows a complete discharge of obligations for the debtor.129 Chapter 13
allows the debtor to keep his or her property while making reduced
payments over time, and calls for a discharge of remaining debt at the end
of the plan.130
Unsurprisingly, the consumer credit industry balked at the passage of
the 1978 bill, though it is arguably fair to say that the credit industry has
balked at every turn since the passage of the 1898 Act.131 In fact, one might
and 75 of the Bankruptcy Act in Actual Operation, 43 YALE L.J. 1285 (1934) (detailing a broad,
empirical assessment of debt composition arrangements preceding the Chandler Act).
125. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 51, at 104.
126. See Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV.
941, 941-42 (1979).
127. See infra Part II.B.
128. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 51, at 109.
129. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 541(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-219) (authorizing creation of
estate consisting of debtor’s assets upon commencement of bankruptcy petition); 11 U.S.C.S. §
704(a)(1) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-219) (authorizing closure of estate after collecting and
reducing available property to money); 11 U.S.C.S. § 726(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-219)
(authorizing distribution of assets according to a schedule); 11 U.S.C.S. § 727(a) (LEXIS through Pub.
L. No. 114-219) (authorizing discharge of debtor’s obligations).
130. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1306(b) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-219) (authorizing debtor to
remain in possession of bankruptcy plan property); 11 U.S.C.S. § 1322(a)-(d) (LEXIS through Pub. L.
No. 114-219) (detailing provisions, optional provisions, and exceptions for administration of payments
under the bankruptcy plan); 11 U.S.C.S. § 1327 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-219) (limiting debtor’s
obligations to those detailed in the bankruptcy plan).
131. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 26-27 (noting a strong push for bankruptcy reform in the 1920s
and 1930s after the passage of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act); see also Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and
the Individual Debtor–And a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L.
REV. 809, 818, 821 (1983) (citing H.R. 12,784, 88th Cong. (1964); H.R. 292, 89th Cong. (1965); S. 613,
89th Cong. (1965); H.R. 1057, 90th Cong. (1967); H.R. 5771, 90th Cong. (1967)) (noting effective
lobbying efforts at the state level that were not achievable by debtors and an attempt by the credit
industry to enact legislation that mirrored a disfavored “conditional or suspended discharge” from
English practice).
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even go so far as to argue that such behavior is their corporate duty when
confronted with legislation such as this.132 Leaving that debate aside, the
1978 bankruptcy law also incorporated language regarding student loans
that was first codified in a 1976 amendment to the Higher Education Act of
1965 (HEA).133 The text of the amendment came from a report made by a
congressional bankruptcy committee formed in 1970.134 The essence of the
rule was to restrict the discharge of federally funded or insured student
loans in bankruptcy for a period of five years after the first payment came
due, unless continuing repayment would cause an “undue hardship” for the
debtor.135
Apparently, the original sponsors of the bankruptcy code disfavored the
addition of the conditional discharge language as applied to student loans.136
However, there was a strong voice of dissent from House member Allen E.
Ertel, who decried the bill “for its failure to preserve the conditional[]
discharge[]” for student loans in bankruptcy.137 In the end, Ertel’s argument
rang loudest, and the amendment was added to both the HEA and the 1978
Bankruptcy Code.138 Congress made several amendments to the Code in the
years following its passage.139 In 1990, under the Crime Control Act of
1990, Congress extended the five-year restriction on discharging student
loans in bankruptcy to seven years, which is of particular concern to the
132. See ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 216 (6th ed. 2009)
(alteration in original) (“[M]any courts and commentators assert that fiduciary rules do (and should)
proceed from a theory of shareholder wealth maximization[,]” which would seem to logically extend to
trying to suppress unfavorable legislation if possible.).
133. Compare § 439(a), 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (alteration in original):
A debt which is a loan insured or guaranteed under the [relevant] authority . . . may be
released by a discharge in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act only if such discharge is
granted after the five-year period . . . beginning on the date of commencement of the
repayment period of such loan, except that prior to the expiration of that five-year period,
such loan may be released only if the court in which the proceeding is pending determines
that payment from future income or other wealth will impose an undue hardship on the debtor
or his dependents.
with § 523(a)(8)(A)-(B), 92 Stat. 2549, 2590 (alteration in original):
A discharge under [relevant authority] does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt
. . . to a governmental unit, or a nonprofit institution of higher education, for an educational
loan, unless—(A) such loan first became due before five years before the date of the filing of
the petition; or (B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 419-20.
See § 523(8)(A)-(B).
See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 420-23.
Id. at 423-24.
See id. at 424-25.
See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 51, at 105.
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student loan analysis.140 Just a few years later in 1998, Congress removed
the time-based restriction entirely, leaving “undue hardship” as the sole
means of affecting a discharge by the bankrupt student debtor—a condition
that persists to this day.141
It has been said that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code was “the first
bankruptcy law in [United States] history not adopted in the immediate
aftermath of a great economic debacle.”142 It would seem then that, as a
corollary to this, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), which appears to be the first
bankruptcy law in American history that was enacted in the middle of an
economic boom.143 Whether or not that had an effect on its passage is hard
to say; though given the broad economic calamity that arrived very shortly
after its enactment, the timing of BAPCPA was seemingly quite fortuitous
for the credit industry.144 At any rate, one of the stated objectives of the
legislation was “to improve bankruptcy law and practice by restoring
personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system.”145 To that
end, the legislative branch determined that consumer (i.e., non-merchant)
debtors should be required to overcome a presumption of abuse before they
may discharge their debt under Chapter 7.146 Apparently, the “personal
responsibility and integrity” of business debtors required no restoration, as
the same presumption of abuse does not apply to merchant debtors seeking
Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief.147
The dismissal of a consumer bankruptcy petition for abuse was not a
new concept; almost twenty years prior to the passage of BAPCPA,
Congress made provisions for a court to dismiss a case on its own motion
“if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse” of
Chapter 7.148 However, the presumption at that time in favor of granting
relief for the debtor, as noted above, was flipped 180 degrees to a

140. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 12, 18, 28 U.S.C.).
141. See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581, 1837
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1002 (2016)).
142. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 51, at 104.
143. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO.
L.J. 1177, 1192-94 (2012) (demonstrating a substantial increase in profits from securitized mortgage
products around 2005, as part of the so-called “housing boom”).
144. See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT 293 (2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
145. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2.
146. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 707(b) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
147. See § 707(b) (1) (LEXIS) (noting that provision only applies to debts that are “primarily
consumer debts”).
148. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 312, 98
Stat. 333 (1984).
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presumption of abuse with the passage of BAPCPA.149 With that change,
this new legislative scheme, in a sense, revived the split between merchants
and non-merchants in bankruptcy that had lain dormant for the better part of
two centuries.150 Nevertheless, BAPCPA did clarify “substantial abuse” by
employing a relatively straightforward means test based on a debtor’s
income and expenses.151 The system is arguably preferable to the previous
method of case-by-case determinations by the judiciary, provided, of
course, that one accepts the relative merits of combating “substantial abuse”
in the first place.152
As this brief historical journey comes to a close, it is worth noting that
much as in Blackstone’s time, efforts to distinguish “consumer” debt from
“business” debt have not always produced the most satisfactory results.153
In fact, some of the decisions on the issue have resulted in oddly drawn
distinctions requiring leaps in logic not dissimilar to Blackstone’s “nonmerchant” farmer noted above.154 For example, it has been ruled that an
individual who ran up $119,486 in personal credit card debt to buy stocks
was not a consumer debtor.155 Nor was a personal loan on a credit card,
made from a father to a daughter to pay for airline tickets, considered a
consumer debt.156 Obviously, there is selective use here, but the point is
that, if the previously mentioned debts cannot necessarily be qualified as de
facto consumer debts, it would seem that, at the very least, the notion
requires a little more thought.157 Put another way, imagine if someone used
a personal credit card to buy $25,000 worth of stocks on Monday, sold them
for a $100 profit on Tuesday, and then used the money to take a cruise
149. See id.
150. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 16-17 (noting the end of the distinction between different classes
of debtors around 1840).
151. See § 707(b)(2) (LEXIS) (authorizing dismissal or conversion of case to chapter 13 if debts
are “primarily consumer debts” and debtor fails to meet criteria set forth in detailed means test at (2)(I)
of that section).
152. See supra Part II.B.
153. See supra Part II.B.
154. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 60 and accompanying text.
155. See In re Almendinger, 56 B.R. 97, 99 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). It is noteworthy that, in
spite of taking over $100,000 worth of cash advances on the debtor’s personal credit cards in an attempt
to recoup stock market losses, the court here still stated, “Ironic though it may sound, [the debtor]
testified that he didn’t use his credit cards for ‘frivolous purchases,’ such as vacations.” Id. (alteration in
original). The Court then, relying in part on that testimony, decided to bar the dismissal. Of course, as
noted above, the presumption at the time was in favor of granting a discharge, but bear in mind that, in
today’s dollars, this debtor’s cash advances would have amounted to over $250,000. See Samuel H.
Williamson, Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, 1774 to Present,
MEASURINGWORTH (2015), http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/index.php (last visited Feb. 28,
2016). With that said, from a creditor’s perspective, it would seem awfully hard to swallow the idea that
squandering $250,000 on stock market speculation is somehow less “frivolous” than if the debtor had
taken an expensive cruise.
156. See In re Reynolds, 49 B.R. 51, 52 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1985).
157. See infra Part II.B.
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around the world on Wednesday. If the debtor only made minimum
payments on the credit card for a couple of years and then filed for Chapter
7 bankruptcy relief, would this then be a “business” debt? There is a fair
amount of case law indicating that the answer would be “yes,” despite the
obvious absurdity of such a result.158
Leaving that aside, one can hopefully see that, within the history of
bankruptcy, a couple of patterns emerge.159 First, it is clear that there has
been a consistent effort to draw distinctions between debts incurred by
merchants from those incurred by non-merchants.160 Yet, the rationale
behind such distinctions is often lacking upon analysis.161 The apparent
underlying cause for this leads to the second discernible pattern in the
development of bankruptcy law—morality and bankruptcy.162
III. MORALITY AND BANKRUPTCY
While the underlying rationale for drawing distinctions between
merchant and non-merchant debtors is not always clear, what this section
will show is the consistent application of moral arguments by the opponents
of non-merchant access to debt relief.163 However, it will also be shown
that critics rarely challenge those same moral arguments, nor do courts
apply them in any meaningful sense to merchant debtors.164 Deconstructing
issues of morality, especially in a historical context, would necessarily
entail far more analysis than could be reasonably accomplished in this
space. However, we need not retreat to the days of Blackstone to see the
practical effect of leveraging morality in discussions about default and
debt.165
With that said, and pertinent to the discussion at hand, let us begin by
focusing on the student loan amendments made to the Higher Education
158. See In re Booth, 858 F.2d 1051, 1054-55 (5th Cir. 1988). Adopting the “profit-motive”
standard, this court stated:
Cases decided under the Truth in Lending Act indicate that when the credit transaction
involves a profit motive, it is outside the definition of consumer credit. After noting the
similarities between the definitions in the Truth in Lending Act and the Bankruptcy Code, the
court in Almendinger adopted the profit motive definition when applying section 707(b).
Because we believe that the profit motive definition is a correct standard in light of the plain
meaning of the statute and its legislative history, we also adopt that standard.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
159. See infra Part II.B.
160. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 51, at 104.
161. See infra Part II.B, Part III.
162. See infra Part III.
163. See infra Part III.
164. See infra Part III.
165. See infra Part III.
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Act.166 As discussed above, prior to the passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code, the conditional discharge of student loans in bankruptcy was first
codified in the HEA.167 One of the more noteworthy aspects of the
discussion surrounding the conditional student loan discharge is the
language that Representative Ertel employed to argue for its retention.168
Rep. Ertel is quoted as saying:
At a time when political, business, and social morality are major
issues, it is dangerous to enact a law that is almost specifically
designed to encourage fraud. For example, as a student leaves
college to find a job, that student would have two options: (1) repay
a substantial loan at a time when that student’s financial situation is
probably at its lowest, or (2) discharge the debt in bankruptcy,
having received the benefit of a free education. If Student A elects
to repay the loan, honoring the legal and moral obligation that was
incurred, he begins his career with a substantial debt and the
accompanying financial pressure. Meanwhile, Student B (who
chooses to declare bankruptcy) can begin with a clean slate . . .
[thus] Student B is rewarded for refusing to honor a legal
obligation. The lesson that Students A and B have learned is that it
‘does not pay’ to honor one’s debts or other legal obligations.169
While much has been made of this in academic literature, perhaps the
most pernicious aspect of this short comment is the introduction of morality
into the discussion.170 To clarify that point, imagine if Rep. Ertel had
instead said:
At a time when political, business, and social morality are major
issues, it is dangerous to enact a law that is almost specifically
designed to encourage fraud. For example, as a small business
owner establishes their business, that owner would have two
options: (1) repay a substantial business loan at a time when the
financial situation of their business is probably at its lowest; or (2)
discharge the debt in bankruptcy, having received the benefit of a
free business start-up . . . .

166.
167.
168.
169.
6424).
170.

See § 439(a), 90 Stat. 2081, 2141.
Id.; see § 523(a)(8)(A)-(B), 92 Stat. 2549, 2590-91.
See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 423-24.
Id. at 424 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 536-37, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
See, e.g., Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 424.
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Of course, it is entirely possible that business people do indeed assess
capital loans in this fashion. Regardless, it should be evident that this
simple substitution engenders a decidedly different innate response—the
original example rings of self-evidence, while the latter carries a tone of
absurdity. As touched on earlier, the original sponsors of the Bankruptcy
Code objected to the inclusion of the conditional language regarding student
loans in the HEA and the Bankruptcy Code.171 Authors Pardo and Lacey
noted that the sponsors actually delayed the law’s implementation until a
requested General Accounting Office (GAO) study on student loan
discharges in bankruptcy could be evaluated.172 Further, in a 2006 paper,
author John A.E. Pottow said of the GAO report that, “[u]nfortunately,
those empirical data, like many empirical data gathered in Washington, fell
on deaf ears. The evidence of a lower than 1% discharge rate of federally
insured student loans in bankruptcy did not block the nondischargeability
provision from entering the Bankruptcy Code.”173
Rather inconveniently though, Rep. Ertel had countered with some data
of his own, demonstrating that “[d]uring the four years from 1972 to 1976,
defaults and delinquencies in federal student loan programs have increased
by more than 300%.”174 He also mentioned the apparent collapse of a
student loan guarantee program administered by the City of Washington
D.C. that “was discontinued when defaults exceeded $2 million (more than
the city had allocated to cover those loans)” to further buttress his
argument.175 The point of this is not to give weight to Rep. Ertel’s numbers
or assertions—for casting doubt on Rep. Ertel’s figures would have been
but a simple matter.176 Rather, this is to call attention to an important
171. See id. at 421-25.
172. See id. at 422.
173. Pottow, supra note 10, at 249.
174. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 537, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6424.
175. Id.
176. See Arthur F. Burns, The Per Jacobsson Found., The 1979 Per Jacobsson Lecture: The
Anguish of Central Banking 8-9 (Sept. 30, 1979), http://www.perjacobsson.org/lectures/1979.pdf. The
period between 1972 and 1976 saw a substantial increase in inflation in the United States. In addition to
the “loose financing of the war in Viet Nam [sic],” the cause of high inflation was also attributed to:
the devaluations of the dollar in 1971 and 1973, the worldwide economic boom of 1972-73,
the crop failures and resulting surge in world food prices in 1973-74, the extraordinary
increases in oil prices that became effective in 1974, and the sharp deceleration of
productivity growth from the late 1960s onward.
Id. at 9 (alteration in original). Of course, this information does not materially alter Rep. Ertel’s
assertion. However, the thrust of Rep. Ertel’s argument was that opportunistic student debtors were
taking advantage of an overly permissive bankruptcy system. With that in mind, it should be clear that,
at the very least, there were numerous economic factors that could have also been driving the increase in
filings. Further, it should also be clear that a reasonable inference might also attribute some of those
same factors to the failure of the Washington D.C. student loan guarantee program.
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distinction.177 As authors Pardo and Lacey stated in their very thoughtful
paper cited above, Rep. Ertel “couched his dissent in inflammatory terms,
resorting to politics of fear.”178 However, this characterization quickly loses
its impact, as just a few pages later, Pardo and Lacey all but endorse Rep.
Ertel’s position by stating:
As a general matter, a debtor who borrows money from a creditor
knows (1) whether or not he intends to repay the debt, and (2) what
circumstances exist or may come into being that reduce the
likelihood of repayment . . . [t]o the extent that the debtor’s
intentions cannot be (or are too costly to be) unearthed by the
creditor, that knowledge is private information unavailable to the
creditor. In a legal regime that discharges debtors from personal
liability for past debts, private information creates a moral hazard.
A debtor who knows that he can obtain a discharge has an incentive
to obtain the extension of credit, use the credit, default on his
repayment obligation, and ultimately file for bankruptcy to
discharge the debt.179
As one can see, the latter half of this statement is essentially what Rep.
Ertel stated about “Student B” above, minus the social prefacing.180 For,
isn’t the “moral hazard” as outlined by Pardo and Lacey exactly what Rep.
Ertel cautioned against when he said that Student B could “discharge the
debt in bankruptcy, having received the benefit of a free education” and
“begin with a clean slate?”181 Doesn’t that necessarily take into account
Student B operating off his own “private information” in choosing not to
repay?182 Pardo and Lacey continued their analysis by stating that “[t]wo
reasons occur to us why moral hazard should be deemed an inappropriate
justification for the conditionally dischargeable status of educational
debt.”183 Those two reasons can be roughly summed as: (1) even though the
moral hazard exists, debtors did not take advantage of it; and (2) there are
already rules in place to deal with people that do take advantage.184
However, this reasoning essentially relegates the topic to a debate about the
best way to deal with moral hazard, when the discussion really should
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
6424).
182.
183.
184.

See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 429-30.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added).
See id. at 424, 429-30 (citations omitted).
See id. at 424 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 536-37, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 429-30.
Id. at 430.
See id.
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address whether or not the whole notion can be reduced to moral absolutes
in the first place.185
To wit, if Pardo’s and Lacey’s “economic principle” is true “as a
general matter,” then why, for example, would an employee ever work for
an employer without being paid up front?186 Providing labor in exchange
for payment at a later date is, in a practical sense, an extension of credit
from employee to employer.187 In such a case, only the employer knows (1)
whether or not she intends to pay the employee; and (2) what circumstances
exist or may come into being that reduce the likelihood of payment.188 For
that matter, does it not logically follow that “private information” and the
concomitant “moral hazard” would also be present in a small business loan
transaction?189 Or in a contract for goods to be delivered with payment due
at a later date?190 With those questions in mind, at the very least it should
be obvious that those “economic principles” outlined above are not
necessarily applicable “as a general matter.”191 In other words, something
else is clearly afoot.
Returning to the student loan amendments, bear in mind that Pardo and
Lacey were fairly critical in their article of the conditional discharge
provision.192 Yet, the arguments they put forward against it are not
materially different from those employed by the legislators that sponsored
the bill.193 Further, they also noted that the bill’s sponsors had the
“unanimous support of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary[,] and the near-unanimous
support of the House Judiciary Committee” to repeal a provision that
“addressed a perceived, rather than real abuse.”194 So, given that these
lawmakers: (1) had the near-unanimous support of their peers—information
that directly contradicted Rep. Ertel’s; and (2) were otherwise not inclined

185. See generally Arthur Ryman, Contract Obligation: A Discussion of Morality, Bankruptcy,
and Student Debt, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 205 (1993); see also id. at 429-30.
186. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 429.
187. See Debbie Zatzman, The Unpaid Employee as Creditor: Case Comment on Homeplan
Realty, 6 DALHOUSIE L.J. 148, 148 (1981) (noting a hypothetical situation in which an unpaid employee
becomes a creditor to the employer for her unpaid labor).
188. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 429.
189. See id. at 429-30.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 429.
192. See generally id.
193. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 430 & n.126 (citing an argument made by the
Bankruptcy Commission in support of its first argument against moral hazard); see also id. at 430 &
n.127 (citing a code section that the Committee likely either wrote, or ostensibly had a hand in writing,
in support of their second argument against moral hazard).
194. Id. at 423.
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to include the conditional language, how is it that it was included
anyway?195
This speaks to the pernicious aspect of the moral language that Rep.
Ertel employed, for once the conditional discharge was established as the
correct moral choice, then pressing for its repeal becomes, in effect,
inferential support for an immoral position.196 Of course, one could never
know for certain the mental state of the legislators that voted either for or
against the measure.197 However, if the “moral hazard” analysis above is
taken as true, then what other incentive would be left for the bill’s sponsors
to stand firm on the issue of allowing student loan discharges in
bankruptcy?198 An overriding desire for fairness? The question becomes
even more specious if those sponsors had, like Pardo and Lacey, already
knowingly or otherwise accepted the underlying rationale supporting the
moral hazard argument.199 Regardless, what is clear is that, despite the
GAO report that demonstrated a “less than one percent” discharge rate for
student loans in bankruptcy, a factually isolated statement noting a 300%
increase in defaults coupled with a naked assertion of moral hazard was, at
least in part, enough to keep the conditional language in the bill.200
Given its seeming effectiveness, it should come as no surprise that
moral language again makes an appearance in the run up to the passage of
BAPCPA.201 The opening text of a 2005 congressional report to
recommend passage of the Act is illustrative, where an increase in
195. Pardo and Lacey argue:
It seems impossible to say from this convoluted history that an unequivocal legislative intent
underlies the Bankruptcy Code’s provision regarding educational debt discharge. On the one
hand, there is the House report, which unmistakably rejects granting any nondischargeable
status—whether conditional or not—to educational debt in bankruptcy, and the Senate report,
which remains silent on the issue. On the other hand, there are several statements by
members of the House, including those of the representative who proposed the
nondischargeability provision, advocating preservation of the status quo.
Id. at 425.
196. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM: A STUDY
OF “BRAINWASHING” IN CHINA 429 (Univ. of North Carolina Press 1989) (1961), for further discussion
and analysis to this effect, provided of course that one adopts the premise of Rep. Ertel’s conclusory
statement. However, as noted below, statements such as the one made by Rep. Ertel can surreptitiously
affect rational thought.
197. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 425.
198. See id. at 423, 429.
199. See id. at 429-30 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 536-37, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6424).
200. See id. at 423-24; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 537, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6426.
201. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 88-89 (stating that the
purpose of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act is to restore “personal
responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system . . . .”).
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bankruptcy filings is partially attributed to a “lack of personal financial
accountability.”202 In support of this argument, the report approvingly cites
the following quote:
[S]hoplifting is wrong; bankruptcy is also a moral act. Bankruptcy
is a moral as well as an economic act. There is a conscious decision
not to keep one’s promises. It is a decision not to reciprocate a
benefit received, a good deed done on the promise that you will
reciprocate. Promise-keeping and reciprocity are the foundation of
an economy and healthy civil society.203
Disregarding the clumsy association of the criminal act of shoplifting
with bankruptcy, the quoted passage, much like Rep. Ertel’s from 1976,
cannot be necessarily held as an absolute, for if it is unequivocally true, then
it must necessarily apply to business bankruptcies as well.204 So, then, by
what rationale would it be acceptable for a bankruptcy estate or debtor-inpossession to avoid preferential payments under Chapter 11?205 Under that
scheme, the debtor must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they
were already insolvent when they made the preferential payment.206 Thus,
in a practical sense, the debtor must know that he or she is insolvent, then
make a payment to a creditor, all the while knowing full well that the
creditor will be forced to disgorge the payment in the future when the debtor
files for bankruptcy protection.207 In other words, the only way to trigger
the avoidance power is if the business receives the benefit of a “good deed
done” on a promise that it knew to be false when it made it.208 What should
be made of this “moral, as well as economic act?”209
Further still, why should it be acceptable for a business to reorganize at
all under Chapter 11, where the defaulting debtor can “[i]n a sense then . . .
force[] the creditors to finance the reorganization venture and to bear the
202. H. R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 89 n.1.
203. H. R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 3, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 89 n.1.
204. See id.; see also Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 424 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 53637, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6424).
205. See MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 438 (3d ed. 2006).
206. See id. at 439 (“The trustee or other person attacking a transfer as preferential has the burden
of establishing that the transfer involved all six elements of a § 547(b) preference. This burden of proof
is met by a preponderance of the evidence.” (citations omitted)); see also 11 U.S.C.S. § 547(b) (LEXIS
through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
207. See SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 205, at 439-40 (This example demonstrates an avoidable
payment from a hypothetical company. A corporation paid the hypothetical to satisfy a “one-year old,
unsecured debt” to a trade creditor that was critical to the operation of the company. The authors note
that even though the payment would have been “unassailable under state law,” § 547(b) would still be
triggered.).
208. See id. at 438; see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 3, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 89 n.1.
209. See id. at 438; see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 3, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 89 n.1.
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risk of losses from it”?210 In such a case, not only has the debtor
consciously decided to “not keep one’s promise,” but that debtor can go
even further and subordinate those broken promises to encourage loans
from new creditors.211 How does that comport with the notion of “a good
deed done on the promise that you will reciprocate?”212 Or, for that matter,
why should it be acceptable in Chapter 11 for a bankrupt company to
assume favorable contracts and simply disregard unfavorable ones?213
Aren’t promise-keeping and reciprocity just as much the foundation of an
economy when dealing with a business?214
Of course, in the business context, there are many factors to consider
when dealing with an insolvent company.215 Scarberry et al. quite rightly
asserted that “[t]he cost to society of business liquidations is high.”216 They
noted the social costs of decreased tax revenues and social welfare for the
displaced workers, as well as the devastating financial effect on creditors
and workers alike.217 With that in mind, they further stated that “[k]eeping
the business in operation will therefore often be much more desirable than
liquidating it.”218 However, the authors also noted that, in some cases, a
bankrupt business may have “no going concern value or a going concern
value less than its liquidation value”—in which case the business should be
shuttered.219 In other words, each situation is going to be fact dependent.220
Obviously, trying to hold firm to platitudes or moral absolutes in fact
dependent situations would only serve to impede solutions.221 As such,
210. SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 205, at 15.
211. See id. at 21. The authors stated:
In effect, the prepetition unsecured creditors are involuntarily subordinated to the postpetition
creditors. This helps create an incentive for the new creditors to extend credit, but it carries
great risks for the prepetition creditors. The new credit may merely permit the debtor to
operate at a loss for a longer time and lose even more money.
Id.
212. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 3, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 89 n.1.
213. See SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 205, at 299-300.
214. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 3, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 89 n.1.
215. See SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 205, at 2.
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 3 (noting that more harm might befall creditors should such an entity continue
operations).
220. See also SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 205, at 2-3 n.3 (“Many courts will allow such a sale
in [C]hapter 11 under the procedurally much easier § 363(b) (1), if there are good reasons for doing so.
Congress could have required that a business in [C]hapter 11 be sold quickly as a going concern, so as to
avoid many of the complexities discussed in this book. However, Congress did not do so and probably
for good reason. There could be severe practical problems with requiring a sale of the assets, especially
a quick sale.” (citation omitted)).
221. See generally Ryman, supra note 185.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol43/iss1/4

26

White: BANKRUPTCY, MORALITY & STUDENT LOANS: A DECADE OF ERROR IN UNDUE

2017]

BANKRUPTCY, MORALITY & STUDENT LOANS

177

rather than being a “moral as well as economic act,” bankruptcy is perhaps
more fairly characterized as a systematic means of disregarding previous
moral and economic acts.222 Or, said more plainly, bankruptcy really ought
to be called a practical means to find equitable solutions to fact dependent
problems.223
Framed in such a fashion, there is no reason to not apply that to
consumer bankruptcy as well.224 A simple illustration should suffice to
clarify this: imagine two friends, Adam and Baker, who decide to go to Las
Vegas to gamble for the weekend. Once there, Baker says to Adam, “Please
loan me $100 for gambling. I promise that I’ll pay you back tomorrow.”
Adam agrees to these terms, and Baker proceeds to lose every penny. Now
imagine that later in the afternoon Baker says to a third friend, Charlie, “I
have made a conscious decision to not keep my promise to Adam. I know
that he did a good deed by loaning me the money to gamble, but I choose
not to reciprocate. Do you think that I am immoral?” It would seem safe to
say that almost anyone in Charlie’s position would respond in the
affirmative.
However, change the facts and imagine instead that when Adam and
Baker are returning from Las Vegas, they are involved in a terrible auto
accident, which leaves Baker permanently paralyzed from the neck down.
If the next day Adam goes to Charlie and says, “Accident or no, Baker
made a promise. He owes me $100 and if he doesn’t pay me today, I’m
going to sue him.” Adam may be technically correct in his assertion, but
from a moral or ethical perspective, it is arguable that such a person would
be almost universally reviled. Now change it further and say that if Adam
does not receive the $100 back, he is going to lose his house. What role
does morality play in Adam and Baker’s situation now?
The obvious point is that it does not really play a role, except in perhaps
an abstract or philosophical sense. Yet, once inserted into a topic that
requires thoughtful contemplation and equitable analysis, statements such as
the ones quoted above essentially become thought-terminating clichés.225 In
222. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 3, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 89 n.1.
223. See In re At Home Corp., 292 B.R. 195, 202 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“Bankruptcy courts have long
possessed the power to exercise equitable powers to further the purposes and goals of the Bankruptcy
Code.” (citation omitted)); see also Pottow, supra note 10, at 260; Edward D. Jellen et al., Recent
Developments in Business Bankruptcy—2003, 27 CAL. BANKR. J. 312, 341 (2004) (“A bankruptcy court
has the equitable power under Bankruptcy Code section 105(a) to partially discharge a student loan, so
long as the discharged portion meets the requirements of Bankruptcy Code section 523(a) (8).” (citation
omitted)).
224. At Home Corp., 292 B.R. at 202 (“Bankruptcy courts have long possessed the power to
exercise equitable powers to further the purposes and goals of the Bankruptcy Code.” (citation omitted));
see also Pottow, supra note 10, at 260.
225. See LIFTON, supra note 196, at 429 (alteration in original) (While defining a thoughtterminating cliché, Lifton says, “The most far-reaching and complex of human problems are compressed
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regards to the passage of BAPCPA, the effect is compounded by the fact
that, unlike Rep. Ertel’s easily disputed facts in 1976, the moral argument
above was not only put forth by a well-known academic, but it was also
accompanied by his eighty-plus page research paper.226 With that said, it is
not as if BAPCPA was without opposition.227 In fact, one of the authors
cited within this article offered very powerful arguments against both the
academic and the reforms, yet those arguments failed to prevent passage of
the Act.228 This speaks to the point, especially when one remembers that
the conditional student loan discharge was adopted in protest by “a
comparatively liberal Congress that passed the debtor-friendly 1978
overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code.”229 Thus, even though Rep. Ertel’s
supporting facts could have been refuted, once they were coupled with a
moral argument, they became sufficient to overcome the objections of
legislators that, for the most part, did not agree with him at all.230 How
difficult of a hill is it to climb when there are two, very credible sounding
experts with extensive, but opposing research, standing before a
legislature?231
This is where the tactical use of moral arguments has its most
demonstrable impact, because decision making in this context is obviously
bounded by the limits of a legislator’s time and cognitive ability, the
complexity of the data, and the information that is available.232 However, in
such a situation, if there are known alternatives to choose from, the
into brief, highly reductive, definitive-sounding phrases, easily memorized and easily expressed. These
become the start and finish of any ideological analysis.” While Lifton was researching thought
manipulation by totalitarian regimes, perhaps unsurprisingly, the definition seems to fit quite nicely in
this context as well.).
226. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 92, at 13 (statement of Todd Zywicki, Visiting
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center); see also Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic
Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2005) [hereinafter Zywicki,
Economic Analysis] (alteration in original) (the latter paper was cited as the source for “[t]he figures
presented in [his] testimony” and is eighty-one pages long).
227. See Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 22 (2005)
(statement of Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School).
228. See id. at 11 (statement of Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School).
229. Pottow, supra note 10, at 249.
230. See id.; see also Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 421-25.
231. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 92, at 10-12 (statement of Elizabeth Warren,
Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School) (statement of Todd J. Zywicki, Visiting Professor
of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
232. See 3 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED
ECONOMIC REASON 291 (1997) [hereinafter RATIONALITY] (While defining this concept as “bounded
rationality,” Simon says, “The term ‘bounded rationality’ is used to designate rational choice that takes
into account the cognitive limitations of the decision-maker—limitations of both knowledge and
computational capacity. Bounded rationality is a central theme in the behavioral approach to economics,
which is deeply concerned with the ways in which the actual decision-making process influences the
decisions that are reached.”).
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legislator will tend to calculate an expected utility value of each and then
simply choose whichever one seems to offer the most utility—regardless of
whether it is necessarily the “right” choice.233 Putting that into this context,
given the complex, opposing data sets offered by two credible academics,
which choice is going to offer more “utility” to an undecided legislator—the
moral one, or an implicitly immoral one?234 To put this in a slightly
different light, imagine a congressional lawmaker that has only a cursory
understanding of bankruptcy law. Before her is a bill to repeal BAPCPA, a
topic that her campaign staff has determined is of neutral value to her
constituency. In hearings about the bill, the first expert she hears from is a
distinguished professor that teaches at a well-known law school, who
provides the following hypothetical testimony:
For the last twenty years, the big banks and finance companies have
engaged in unethical and immoral behavior that nearly destroyed
the United States economy as we know it. They poured millions of
dollars into questionable research to enact laws favorable to their
bottom line, while using millions more to dismantle even the most
basic of consumer protections, like they did with BAPCPA. They
did this all with the promise that doing so would be good for all of
us, and good for America.
But, when their schemes didn’t pay off as they had hoped, instead
of taking responsibility, they broke their promise to America. They
made a conscious decision not to reciprocate a benefit received, a
good deed done on the promise that the changes they asked for were
good for the economy. Instead, they took billions of dollars in
bailouts, gave themselves enormous bonuses, and then left the
taxpayers in economic ruin while they enjoyed record profits. This
is not only wrong; it is immoral, because promise-keeping and
reciprocity are the foundation of an economy and healthy civil
society.
Now they say that we still need BAPCPA. We need it not because
it helps them keep their ill-gotten profits. No, they say it’s because
before the law, bankruptcies were on the rise. They claim that they
233. See HERBERT A. SIMON, AN EMPIRICALLY BASED MICROECONOMICS 17 (1997) [hereinafter
MICROECONOMICS] (“Bounded rationality, a rationality that is consistent with our knowledge of actual
human choice behavior, assumes that the decision maker must search for alternatives, has egregiously
incomplete and inaccurate knowledge about the consequences of actions, and chooses actions that are
expected to be satisfactory (attain targets while satisfying constraints).”).
234. See id. at 17; see also Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 92, at 10-12 (statement of
Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School) (statement of Todd J. Zywicki,
Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
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were rising because it was too easy to file for bankruptcy. Yet, the
charts below show that the increase in bankruptcies went up at
almost the exact same rate that the Dow Jones Industrial Average
did. It should be clear from the charts that they’re just using the
same misinformation they did before in order to hide their real
motivation—profit at any expense.235

235. See FCIC Report, supra note 144, at 401 (“The securities industry has reported record profits
and is once again distributing large bonuses just for those who work in New York City, bonuses at Wall
Street securities firms in 2009 were $20.3 billion, up 17% from the year before, with ‘average
compensation [rising] by 27 percent to more than $340,000.’ After reporting $54 billion of losses during
2007 and 2008, the New York State Comptroller reported that in 2009, ‘industry profits reached a record
$61.4 billion—almost triple the level of three years earlier.’”). The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(FCIC) says:
[T]he financial industry itself played a key role in weakening regulatory constraints on
institutions, markets, and products. It did not surprise the Commission that an industry of
such wealth and power would exert pressure on policy makers and regulators. From 1999 to
2008, the financial sector expended $2.7 billion in reported federal lobbying expenses;
individuals and political action committees in the sector made more than $1 billion in
campaign contributions.
Id. at xviii; see Robert M. Lawless & Elizabeth Warren, Shrinking the Safety Net: The 2005 Changes in
U.S. Bankruptcy Law 2 (Univ. Ill. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. LE06-031, 2006),
http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstract id=949629 (noting that the credit industry had “hired an army of
lobbyists and publicists” to push for unnecessary changes to BAPCPA).
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236

In light of the fact pattern above, what sort of facts and figures would be
sufficient to persuade this legislator to vote in favor of the financial
industry? Is it going to matter to her that the increase in the DJIA and the
rate of bankruptcy filings are a factually isolated correlation? Even if that
did matter to her, how would she explain such a concept in a ten-second
soundbite to the public that voted for her? Given the choice between
digesting a detailed, eighty-page economic and legal research document
supplied by the financial industry or simply voting for the “moral” choice,
which one wins in a contest of political “utility”? How much further does
the scale tip if the hypothetical academic also has a detailed, eighty-page
economic and legal research document to back her claims? Even absent
236. See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 226, at 1468 fig.1; see also Dow Jones—100
Year Historical Chart, MACROTRENDS, http://www.macrotrends.net/1319/dow-jones-100-year-historical
-chart (last visited Sept. 11, 2016).
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that, is it realistic to think that a legislator with a currently neutral
constituency would risk a negative response simply to support the financial
industry’s interests, even if they were in the right? Beyond a fanciful
journey through morality and politics, this all bears on the broader
discussion at hand regarding student loan discharges in bankruptcy, because
as shall now be seen, the effects outlined above are not limited to the
legislative branch.237
IV. UNDUE HARDSHIP
As noted by many courts and commentators, when Congress passed the
1978 Bankruptcy Code, it declined to provide a definition for “undue
hardship.”238 Consequently, in the years following the Code’s passage, the
courts developed a number of tests in order to define “undue hardship,” and
these have essentially coalesced into the two predominant tests in use
today.239 Both tests offer a significant barrier to student loan discharges in
bankruptcy, and while there is some variation, there seems to be little
difference between the two schemes when it comes to discharging student
loan obligations.240 However, perhaps one of the oddest things within all of
that judicial wrangling is the fact that Congress uses the term “undue
hardship” twice in the bankruptcy code—once in the section regarding
exemptions, and again in the section regarding the effects of discharge.241
This is odd for two reasons: first, in the 261 opinions that Pardo and
Lacey examined in their 2005 paper (cited in this article), they only found
one instance of a court taking note of the aforementioned fact, and that was
in a case decided in 2001.242 This gives rise to the second reason, which is
that the undue hardship language in both sections of the Code goes back to
its passage in 1978.243 Thus, by the time Congress passed BAPCPA in
2005, twenty-plus years of judicial statutory construction passed before a
237. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 487.
238. See, e.g., id. at 486-87.
239. See id. at 487 (“[T]wo judicial tests account[] for the overwhelming majority (86%) applied
by bankruptcy courts in [Pardo & Lacey’s] study[.]” The authors then further identify the tests as the
Brunner test and the totality of the circumstances test. (alteration in original)).
240. See id. at 487 (noting similar discharge rates for the two tests, with 49% of petitioners under
either test receiving a discharge).
241. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(8) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-219) (noting that certain debts
are exempt from discharge “unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would
impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents”); see also 11 U.S.C.S. §
524(c)(3)(B) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-219) (stating that an agreement to waive a dischargeable
debt is only valid if “such agreement does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor”).
242. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 511 n.408.
243. See § 523(8)(B), 92 Stat. at 2591 (stating of an otherwise exempt student loan, “excepting
such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the
debtor’s dependents . . . .”).
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court even attempted to look anywhere else in the Code for assistance in
determining the meaning of the phrase.244 Further, with the passage of
BAPCPA in 2005, Congress provided a clear definition for undue hardship
under § 524, in the form of statutorily mandated disclosures that a debtor
must acknowledge prior to reaffirming an otherwise dischargeable debt.245
One of the forms reads in pertinent part: “I understand that if my income
less my monthly expenses does not leave enough to make the payments, this
reaffirmation agreement is presumed to be an undue hardship on me and
must be reviewed by the court.”246
It bears mentioning here that a recent court said of statutory
construction that “it is axiomatic that a term ‘may have a plain meaning in
the context of a particular section’ of a statute without having ‘the same
meaning in all other sections and in all other contexts.’”247 The court
attempted to determine the meaning of the phrase “gainful employment” as
used in HEA, but pulled the internally quoted language from Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co.248 In turn, the Robinson court attempted to determine the
meaning of the word “employees” in yet another statute.249 In Robinson, the
Supreme Court stated that “[o]nce it is established that the term ‘employees’
includes former employees in some sections, but not in others, the term
standing alone is necessarily ambiguous and each section must be analyzed
to determine whether the context gives the term a further meaning.”250
However, this is clearly not the case with BAPCPA, as the context in both
sections in which the term “undue hardship” appears is nearly identical—
namely, the potentially detrimental effect upon a debtor in continuing to pay
for a nondischargeable debt.251
Further, the term “undue hardship” makes an appearance in the lead up
to BAPCPA, when Congress said that it was modifying section 362(b) of
244. See id.
245. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 524(c)(2) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-219) (noting requirement to
receive disclosures described in subsection (k)).
246. 11 U.S.C.S. § 524(k)(1), (3)(J) (LEXIS) (“Part D: Debtor’s Statement in Support of
Reaffirmation Agreement . . . . I understand that if my income less my monthly expenses does not leave
enough to make the payments, this reaffirmation agreement is presumed to be an undue hardship on me
and must be reviewed by the court.”).
247. Ass’n of Private Sector Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 186 (D.
D.C. 2015) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343 (1997)), aff’d No. 15-5190 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 8, 2016).
248. See id. at 187.
249. See id. at 186.
250. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 343-44.
251. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(8) (LEXIS) (noting the debt would be nondischargeable unless it
caused an undue hardship); see also 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(10) (LEXIS) (barring discharge of a debt “that
was or could have been listed or scheduled by the debtor in a prior case concerning the debtor under this
title or under the Bankruptcy Act in which the debtor waived discharge, or was denied a discharge . . .
.”).
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the Code to allow a debtor’s tax refund to set off a prepetition tax obligation
without court approval.252 This was done because “[i]nterest and penalties
that may continue to accrue may also be nondischargeable . . . and cause
individual debtors undue hardship.”253 Clearly, the rationale behind that
modification accords quite well with the usage of “undue hardship” in § 523
and § 524, for it again speaks directly to the potentially detrimental effect
on a debtor in paying for a nondischargeable debt.254 Thus, there is not only
clear statutory usage of the phrase “undue hardship,” but there is also
legislative history that supports a similar application of the phrase in a
similar setting.255
Returning to Robinson, the Supreme Court stated that its “first step in
interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a
plain and unambiguous meaning . . . [o]ur inquiry must cease if the statutory
language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent.’”256 The Court went on to say that “[t]he plainness or ambiguity
of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of
the statute as a whole.”257 Following these three simple prongs in order,
Merriam-Webster defines “undue” as “more than is reasonable or
necessary.”258 Further, it defines “hardship” as “something that causes pain,
suffering or loss.”259 Combined, this gives a rough definition for “undue
hardship” as that which “unreasonably or unnecessarily causes pain,
suffering, or loss.”260
Arguably, “pain” and “suffering” likely do occur in some fashion in the
bankruptcy context, but for purposes of legally defining a financial
hardship, these terms do not seem ideally oriented to the task.261 However,
Merriam-Webster offers a definition of “loss” that reads “money that is
spent and that is more than the amount earned or received,” which seems
nearly purpose built.262 Putting this all together, we can fashion a definition
of “undue hardship” that tracks along the lines of “something that
252. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 104-05.
253. Id.
254. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(8) (LEXIS); see also 11 U.S.C.S. § 524(c)(2), (k) (LEXIS).
255. See § 523(8)(B), 92 Stat. at 2591.
256. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
257. Id. at 341 (citations omitted).
258. Simple Definition of Undue, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com (search
“undue” in search bar on main page) [hereinafter Undue].
259. Simple Definition of Hardship, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com
(search “hardship” in search bar on main page) [hereinafter Hardship].
260. Undue, supra note 258; Hardship, supra note 259.
261. Undue, supra note 258; Hardship, supra note 259.
262. Simple Definition of Loss, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com (search
“loss” in search bar on main page) [hereinafter Loss].
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unreasonably or unnecessarily causes money to be spent that is more than
the amount earned or received.”263 Recalling § 524, which states that “I
understand that if my income less my monthly expenses does not leave
enough to make the payments, this reaffirmation agreement is presumed to
be an undue hardship on me and must be reviewed by the court,” it would
seem that, regardless of the rationale that preceded the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code, the definition above appears to reasonably comport with what
Congress likely intended when they wrote BAPCPA.264
As such, if (1) the definition above coherently addresses the language
itself; (2) the specific contexts in which that language is used are consistent
in the statute; and (3) the broader context of the statute as a whole deals
with ameliorating the deleterious effects of defaulting on debt, then it would
seem that all three prongs of the Robinson test are satisfied.265 Therefore, it
logically follows that judicial inquiry “must cease” in regards to defining
undue hardship, as “the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’”266 However, the incorrect
statutory construction by the judiciary is not the only issue present, as an
analysis of the two most commonly employed tests for undue hardship will
now reveal.267
A. Judicial Tests for Undue Hardship
The Brunner test derives its name from a 1985 bankruptcy case that was
subsequently affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in 1987.268 In that affirmation, the Second Circuit wrote that:
[T]he district court adopted a standard for ‘undue hardship’
requiring a three-part showing: (1) that the debtor cannot maintain,
based on current income and expenses, a ‘minimal’ standard of
living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans;
(2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of
affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment

263. See Undue, supra note 258; Hardship, supra note 259; Loss, supra note 262.
264. 11 U.S.C.S. § 524(k)(1), (3)(J) (LEXIS) (“Part D: Debtor’s Statement in Support of
Reaffirmation Agreement . . . . I understand that if my income less my monthly expenses does not leave
enough to make the payments, this reaffirmation agreement is presumed to be an undue hardship on me
and must be reviewed by the court.”).
265. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340 (citation omitted) (quoting Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. at
240); see also Undue, supra note 258; Hardship, supra note 259; Loss, supra note 262.
266. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340 (citation omitted) (quoting Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. at
240).
267. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 14, at 487.
268. See generally In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d per curiam, 831 F.2d 395
(2d Cir. 1987).
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period of the student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good
faith efforts to repay the loans.269
As one can clearly see, the test as articulated envisions inquiries into the
debtor’s income, both past and future. Additionally, before one can make a
determination of “undue hardship,” there must be a demonstration of “good
faith” by the debtor in attempting repayment.270 In 1981, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rendered a decision in Andrews v.
S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews)271 in which it: (1)
articulated the totality of the circumstances test (the totality test); and (2)
subsequently reaffirmed the test in Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.(In re
Long)272 in 2003.273 In the latter case, the Eighth Circuit gave guidance in
administering the test as follows: “[i]n evaluating the totality-of-thecircumstances, our bankruptcy reviewing courts should consider: (1) the
debtor’s past, present, and reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2)
a calculation of the debtor’s and her dependent’s reasonable necessary
living expenses; and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances
surrounding each particular bankruptcy case.”274 Similar to the Brunner test
above, one can clearly see a test that delves into the debtor’s income, and
that both tests require some manner of inquiry into the debtor’s necessary
expenses, with the latter tacking on the circumstantial language in place of
the “good faith” prong.275
One should note here that both of these tests draw heavily from
comments made in a report by the Bankruptcy Commission to Congress in
1973.276 In forming its namesake test, the Brunner court relies in large part

269. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987) (per
curiam).
270. See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396-97.
271. 661 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1981).
272. 322 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2003).
273. See Long, 322 F.3d at 553 (citing Andrews, 661 F.2d at 702).
274. Id. at 554.
275. Id. at 553-54.
276. See Brunner, 46 B.R. at 754 (“As a calculation of ‘undue hardship,’ the Commission
envisioned a determination of whether the amount and reliability of income and other wealth which the
debtor could reasonably be expected to receive in the future could maintain the debtor and his or her
dependents at a minimal standard of living as well as pay off the student loans.”); see also Andrews, 661
F.2d at 704 (“In order to determine whether the nondischargeability of the student loan would impose an
‘undue hardship’ on the debtor, the Commission stated that: . . . the rate and amount of [the debtor’s]
future resources should be estimated reasonably in terms of ability to obtain, retain, and continue
employment and the rate of pay that can be expected. Any unearned income or other wealth which [sic]
the debtor can be expected to receive should also be taken into account. The total amount of income, its
reliability, and the periodicity of its receipt should be adequate to maintain the debtor and [the debtor’s]
dependents, at a minimal standard of living within their management capability, as well as to pay the
educational debt.”).
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on In re Johnson,277 In re Andrews, and In re Briscoe278 for much of its
analysis.279 The Brunner court utilizes In re Briscoe in support of the need
to estimate the debtor’s future earnings and the conditional need for a
“certainty of hopelessness” in not being able to repay.280 All four of these
decisions, in whole or in part, reference the following passage from the
aforementioned 1973 report:
In order to determine whether nondischargeability of the debt will
impose an ‘undue hardship’ on the debtor, the rate and amount of
his future resources should be estimated reasonably in terms of
ability to obtain, retain, and continue employment and the rate of
pay that can be expected. Any unearned income or other wealth
which the debtor can be expected to receive should also be taken
into account. The total amount of income, its reliability, and the
periodicity of its receipt should be adequate to maintain the debtor
and his dependents, at a minimal standard of living within their
management capability, as well as to pay the educational debt.281
As noted above, not only does the Brunner court cite In re Andrews, but
Andrews also forms the basis of the totality test favored by the Eighth
Circuit.282 Andrews further references yet another case, In re Wegfehrt,283
which also pulls the same text noted above.284 However, the Wegfehrt court
goes further still and quotes two particularly illuminating passages in
support of its findings.285 The first quote reads: “a few serious abuses of the
bankruptcy laws by debtors with large amounts of educational loans, few
other debts, and well-paying jobs, who have filed bankruptcy shortly after
leaving school and before any loans became due, have generated the
movement for an exception to discharge,” while the second quote states
that: “[i]f under eighty percent (80%) of the debtor’s debts were educational
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

No. 77-2033 TT, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 1979).
16 B.R. 128 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See generally Brunner, 46 B.R. at 752.
Id. at 755.
Brunner, 46 B.R. at 754 (citing COMMUNICATION FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING A REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. I [sic], at
140-41 n.17 (1973)); Andrews, 661 F.2d at 704 (citation omitted) (citing In re Wegfehrt, 10 B.R. 826,
830 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (referencing H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. II, at 140-41 n.17)); Johnson, 1979
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428 at **21-22 (citing H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. II, at 140-41 n.17); Briscoe, 16
B.R. at 130 (citation omitted) (citing H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. II, at 140-41 n.17).
282. See Long, 322 F.3d at 554.
283. 10 B.R. at 826.
284. See id. at 830.
285. See id. at 829-30 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 133 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6094).
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debts, then it is likely that the debtor has encountered financial difficulty
after school, and that the bankruptcy is a result of a true need for bankruptcy
relief rather than an abuse of the bankruptcy system.”286
With that said, if one steps back a bit, what is plain to see is that the two
predominant tests for determining undue hardship are judicially created,
means-based tests rooted in a Congressional desire to prevent abuse of the
bankruptcy system.287 In fact, the Wegfehrt court actually said of the
petitioner that “[t]his Court is of the opinion that debtor herein is not guilty
of the intentional abuse of bankruptcy laws which 11 U.S.C. Section
523(a)(8) was intended to bar.”288 Bear in mind, of course, that at the time
these cases were decided, the bankruptcy court had provisions in place to
dismiss a case “if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial
abuse” of Chapter 7.289 Thus, it was entirely appropriate for the courts to
fashion the tests outlined above to further the policy of preventing abuse in
the undue hardship context.290
However, with the passage of BAPCPA, this is no longer the case, as
Congress has precluded the judiciary from precisely this type of
endeavor.291 To wit, Congress states that “[t]he standard for dismissal—
substantial abuse—is inherently vague, which has led to its disparate
interpretation and application by the bankruptcy bench.”292 In order to
remedy this, Congress amended the law to “require a court to presume that
abuse exists if the amount of the debtor’s remaining income, after certain
expenses and other specified amounts are deducted from the debtor’s
current monthly income.”293 In support of this, the academic noted above
said:
[c]urrent law requires a case-by-case investigation that turns on
little more than the personal predilections of the judge. The Bill
narrows the judge’s discretion by establishing a presumption of
abuse where a high-income debtor has the ability to repay a
substantial portion of his debts, as measured by an objective
standard.294

286. Id.
287. See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396; see also Long, 322 F.3d at 553-54 (alteration in original).
288. Wegfehrt, 10 B.R. at 830.
289. See § 312, 98 Stat. at 355.
290. See id.
291. See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
292. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. I, at 12.
293. Id. at 13.
294. Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 92, at 248 (statement of Todd Zywicki, Visiting
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
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So, while the “the judge will retain discretion to override this
presumption in cases of hardship,” the judge has not been afforded the
discretion to make determinations of what constitutes abuse for over a
decade now.295 In fact, BAPCPA provides very clear, income-based
guidelines on what is or is not abusive conduct by the consumer debtor, and
it requires a judge to convert or dismiss the case if the debtor falls outside of
those guidelines.296 Further, as noted above, Congress has also specifically
drafted a test to determine when an undue hardship exists in relation to a
debtor’s ability to pay a continuing, nondischargeable obligation.297 With
that said, by what reading of the statute does the judiciary then presume to
impart its own means test using a “case-by-case investigation that turns on
little more than the personal predilections of the judge” in determining if
undue hardship claims are “an abuse of the bankruptcy system?”298 Such a
judicial policy may have had its place under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, but
that Code is no longer the law of the land.299
It has been said by both the courts and commentators alike that the
increase in restrictions on discharging student loans in bankruptcy
demonstrates that Congress wants the bar to discharge to be made more
difficult.300 Yet, the assertion only has merit if taken in isolation, for while
it is true that the time-based restrictions have been curtailed, it is also true
that determinations of what abusive conduct is and when a condition
imposes an undue hardship have been greatly clarified as well.301 Put
another way, it could be fairly said that while Congress has increased the
restrictions on discharging student loan debt, it has also restricted a judge’s
discretion in determining both when abuse is occurring and what standard of
living is acceptable for a debtor post discharge.302 Congress did this by
requiring the judiciary to use a statutorily mandated means test that also
accounts for a debtor’s reasonable expenses.303 Further, just as Congress
clarified when abuse is occurring, it also made clear when an undue
hardship exists and, by rational extension, when a debtor should be allowed
295. Id.
296. See generally 11 U.S.C.S. § 707(b) (LEXIS) (detailing requirements for determining abuse
and requirement for dismissal or conversion if abuse is determined by results of means test).
297. See Wegfehrt, 10 B.R. at 830.
298. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 92, at 248 (statement of Todd Zywicki, Visiting
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center); see also id.
299. See generally 119 Stat. at 23.
300. See, e.g., Pottow, supra note 10, at 250 (quoting In re Cox, 338 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir.
2003)) (“Congress’s [sic] intent to make it harder for a student to shift his debt responsibility onto the
taxpayer.”).
301. See § 102(a), 119 Stat. at 27 (providing tests for when abuse exists).
302. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 707(b) (LEXIS) (listing statutorily allowable expenses and means of
calculating them).
303. See id.
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to eliminate student loan debt in bankruptcy.304 Rather than making student
loan discharge insurmountable, Congress instead appears to have made it
difficult, yet also more equitable, by removing judicial interpretation of the
debtor’s means and standard of living entirely.305
As such, it should be clear that after a debtor overcomes the statutory
presumption of abuse and then further demonstrates in an adversarial
proceeding that their “income less [their] monthly expenses does not leave
enough to make [their] payments,” they should be allowed to discharge their
student loan debt as an undue hardship.306 If Congress subsequently
determines that such a policy is too “loose,” it is free to fashion a new
regulation or test as it sees fit.307 However, what should be abundantly clear
is that, under the law as it currently stands, the judiciary absolutely may not
make this determination.308
V. CONCLUSION
Though the research is clear, it is not lost on this author that this paper
essentially proposes that over a decade of judicial decision making is clearly
erroneous.309 It was largely with this in mind that the discussion on moral
hazard and moral arguments was developed in Part III.310 For, not only
does this paper posit that over a decade of judicial decision-making is
incorrect, it also points out that even some of the staunchest opponents of
the undue hardship tests have missed the broader point as well.311 This
traces back to the discussion in Part II, for it is arguably the central purpose
of the “thought-terminating cliché” to do what has ostensibly happened in
this context—namely, to prevent otherwise conscientious and thoughtful
people from seeing clearly erroneous information.312
While the use of moral arguments may have been a bit disingenuous in
enacting BAPCPA, the perhaps unintended consequence of the new
regulations is that they clearly make more room for the student debtor to
discharge loans in bankruptcy, if one allows themselves to step back from
the myopia of the current analysis.313 For those who might question the
wisdom of such a judicial policy, it one should note that the Duncan case
304. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. I, at 234-35.
305. See id. at 233-35.
306. See id. at 242.
307. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
308. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 92, at 248 (statement of Todd Zywicki, Visiting
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
309. See supra Part I.
310. See supra Part III.
311. See supra Part III.
312. See LIFTON, supra note 196, at 429.
313. See supra Part III.
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cited above is (as of this writing) a very recent case that approved new tests
by the Department of Education (DOE) “to establish minimal measures for
determining whether certain post-secondary educational programs lead to
gainful employment in recognized occupations.”314 The consequence of an
institution failing this test is that they will no longer qualify for federally
guaranteed student loans.315 In other words, DOE is trying “to ensure that
participating schools actually prepare their students for employment, such
that those students can repay their loans.”316
To determine if a student loan recipient is gainfully employed, the DOE
will use the two tests as follows:
The first is a debt-to-discretionary-income metric, which the
Department calculates by dividing the median annual loan payment
for a program’s students by those same students’ discretionary
income (which is equal to ‘the higher of the mean or median annual
earnings’ of the students minus 150% of the poverty-guidelines
figure). The second is a debt-to-annual-income metric, which the
Department calculates using a simpler equation—just dividing the
median annual loan payment for a program’s students by the mean
or median annual earnings of those students, whichever is greater.317
These new tests are likely in response to DOE’s recent findings that
“nearly 3 million Direct Loan borrowers [are] more than 30 days delinquent
on their loans, and 3.2 million borrowers are in default on more than $44
billion in Federal loans.”318 As such, it seems eminently reasonable that
DOE take steps to ensure that taxpayer dollars are allocated to programs
that will actually provide some benefit to the recipients.319 However, these
new tests are also going to come too late to help those that have already
borrowed to pay for an education, but still find themselves in default or
worse yet, as part of the 16% of unemployed graduates that have almost no
possibility of relief.320 It is unconscionable to burden an entire generation
314. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 182.
315. See id. at 183 (“A program loses eligibility for all Title IV financial aid if it fails the debt-toearnings test for two out of three consecutive years[.]”).
316. See id. at 181.
317. See id. at 183.
318. U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., STRENGTHENING THE STUDENT LOAN SYSTEM TO BETTER PROTECT
ALL BORROWERS 6 (2015), http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/strengthening-student-loansystem.pdf.
319. See generally id.
320. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS 4 (2012) (alteration in
original), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_Reports_Private-Student-Loans.pdf (“In 2009,
the unemployment rate for private student loan borrowers who started school in the 2003-2004 academic
year was 16%.”). It should be said that, while the figures represented are dated, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) also pointed out in a later report that 25% of student loan borrowers are
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of students with a potential lifetime of debt based on erroneous
presumptions and outdated tests that do not represent the current state of the
law.321 Those encumbered by unmanageable debts precisely represent the
fact-dependent issues that the mechanism of bankruptcy is designed to
address.322 With that said, applying the undue hardship analysis, as
demonstrated above, to those fact-dependent issues is hardly
revolutionary.323 It is simply following the law and common sense.

“collectively, either delinquent or in default on more than $175 billion in student debt.” See CONSUMER
FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, STUDENT LOAN SERVICING: ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC INPUT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 9 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_studentloan-servicing-report.pdf. “[T]here are also significant gaps in available data about higher education and
student loan performance, including key outcome measures such as job attainment and wage
information[.]” Id. at 10. Thus, the information from 2009 was utilized for illustrative purposes.
321. See supra Part III.
322. See supra Part III.
323. See supra Part IV.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol43/iss1/4

42

